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Theories of Valuation – Building Blocks for 
Conceptualizing Valuation between 
Practice and Structure 
Anne K. Krüger & Martin Reinhart ∗ 
Abstract: »Theorien der Valuierung - Bausteine zur Konzeptualisierung von Valu-
ierung zwischen Praxis und Struktur«. Phenomena of attributing value to objects, 
practices, and people, and of assessing their value have become a popular subject 
in sociological research. Classification, among other valuation practices, repre-
sents a central topic in these studies. Thus, the sociology of valuation is emerging 
as a new field that, however, lacks common ground in theorizing about its subject 
even though preoccupation with valuation has a long-standing history in sociol-
ogy. Authors such as Durkheim, Simmel, and Dewey have interpreted valuation as 
more than a specific localizable phenomenon, in that valuation is a constitutive 
element of the fundament of the social. Discussing classical approaches to valua-
tion and relating them to current sociological work, we identify key concepts 
within different theoretical approaches that need to be taken into account when 
theorizing valuation. We suggest five building blocks – valuation practices, value 
structures, valuation infrastructure, valuation situations, and reflexivity of valua-
tion – theories of valuation need to consider for coming to terms with the multi-
faceted empirical studies in the sociology of valuation. 
Keywords: Valuation, practice, structure, infrastructure, situativeness, reflexivity. 
1.  Introduction 
Suggesting that “classification situations may have become the engine of mod-
ern class situations” (Fourcade and Healy 2013, 559), Fourcade and Healy have 
demonstrated that markets do not just reproduce social structure but generate 
new classifications that have structural consequences. Classifications in mar-
kets, i.e. in their case the attribution of credit worthiness based on big data and 
new technology, assess value not simply based on a pregiven value system but 
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instead generate their own specific value structure. Classification is thus a 
powerful valuation practice.  
This finding is not only consequential for economic sociology and the soci-
ology of markets, but also for sociological fields of study such as the sociology 
of science or science and technology studies among others. Understanding 
classification as a performative act of valuation that generates its own value 
structure thus raises the question of how valuation practices and value struc-
tures relate to each other.  
In this paper, we aim at deducing insights from different fields of sociologi-
cal analysis to conceptualize valuation by drawing on classical and current 
literature. Market classifications will be one current and prominent case of a 
valuation process that provides a starting point to move from the sociological 
analysis of markets to sociological theory on valuation in general. In the con-
text of this HSR Special Issue, Fourcade and Healy’s work will be used to ask 
what further insights can be gained by conceptualizing market classification as 
one of many valuation processes. 
Even though value or values are central to many (classical) sociological the-
ories, interest in the concept has waned in the second half of the 20th century as 
the explanatory significance of value(s) for social action has become increas-
ingly implausible. However, a recent interest in valuation practices is clearly 
discernible across a number of fields within the social sciences (Lamont 2012). 
Despite the heterogeneity of this debate, a common perspective lies in viewing 
valuation as a practice and thus as performative. The growing interest in valua-
tion practices may be explained as a reaction to ubiquitous evaluation regimes 
and the diagnosis of an audit society (Power 1997). The shift from value to 
valuation – or from class to classification as in the case of Fourcade and Healy 
– suggests a reemergent interest in the generation of value and the commitment 
of people to value ascriptions (Joas 1999). Even though these questions were 
central to theorists at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century 
such as Friedrich Nietzsche, William James, Emile Durkheim, Georg Simmel, 
Max Scheler, or John Dewey (Joas and Knöbl 2009, 524) systematic reference 
to these works is largely absent from the current debate. It is, thus, only fitting 
that Lamont (2012) has called for more theory building based on the numerous 
and heterogeneous studies on valuation. 
In order to meet the need for more theoretical coherence within the sociolo-
gy of valuation, the field has to overcome two challenges. First, as a highly 
diverse field providing no obvious commonalities to base a theory of valuation 
on, common ground besides the interest in valuation practices has to be estab-
lished. Second, the currently growing interest in valuation suggests that valua-
tion practices have changed and grown in societal importance so that a straight-
forward extension of existing theories of valuation has little appeal and 
classical approaches may provide only partial solutions. We think that these 
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challenges can be overcome, when one accepts that a single, all-encompassing 
theory of valuation may not be the answer.  
Therefore, our aim in this paper is to identify central assumptions and key 
concepts within different theoretical approaches that need to be taken into 
account when theorizing valuation. First, we will discuss some classical ap-
proaches to valuation and, second, relate them to current work in different fields 
of sociological analysis that, however, can be considered as part of the sociology 
of valuation. Third, we suggest five elements – valuation practices, value struc-
tures, valuation infrastructure, valuation situations, and reflexivity of valuation – 
theories of valuation need to consider for coming to terms with the multifaceted 
empirical studies in the sociology of valuation. Finally, we will conclude with 
some thoughts on positioning valuation between practice and structure.  
2.  Classification within Valuation Studies 
In their eponymous contribution to this HSR Special Issue, Fourcade and Healy 
(2017 [2013]) argue against the idea that classifications that become relevant in 
markets can only be found outside the market provided by other institutions 
such as e.g. the state. Instead, they find that new technology has moved the 
action of classification within the market. Large amounts of consumer data and 
sophisticated algorithms allow to classify people based on past market behavior 
in fine-grained risk groups without having to rely on classifications from else-
where. These market classifications “thrive on the market’s competitive logic, 
demanding that people be measured against one another, and then separating 
and recombining them into groups for efficiency and profit” (Fourcade and 
Healy 2013, 560). The broader social implications stem from the increased 
reliance on quantification and algorithms to determine life-chances instead of 
“a priori identification of fundamental social categories […and] ‘subjective’ 
schemes of perception and action” (Fourcade and Healy 2013, 561). Market 
classifications are thus not simply seen as producing heterarchical modes of 
valuation by providing different services to consumers according to their indi-
vidual preferences or needs. Instead, when the services offered differ in merit 
or cost, thus allowing for hierarchical modes of valuation, market classifications 
do not only display but moreover generate the life-chances of the individual. 
The work of Fourcade and Healy is exemplary for a sociology of valuation 
in that it focuses on classification as a valuation practice. Phenomena of attrib-
uting value to objects, practices, and people, and of assessing their value (for this 
distinction see Lamont 2012; Kjellberg and Mallard 2013, 20), have become a 
popular subject in sociological research, particularly in economic sociology, 
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sociology of science and science and technology studies1 following up on a line 
of work including e.g. Zelizer (1978, 1985, 2011), Espeland and Stevens (1998, 
2008), or Bowker and Star (1999). Classification, among other valuation practic-
es, represents a central topic in these studies. As valuation practices, classifica-
tions are foundational in that they, on the one hand, ascribe value to objects com-
paratively and, on the other hand, prearrange objects for further valuation. 
Classification can thus be understood as the construction of a particular order 
among objects, practices, and people due to the comparative attribution of value. 
From such a view, classification appears not only as fundamentally social 
but also as fundamental to the social. We thus claim that, first, theorizing clas-
sification implies theorizing classification as a valuation practice and, second, 
that a theory of valuation should provide more than a conceptualization of 
valuation practices in that it should also theorize them as an omnipresent and 
fundamental activity of the social.  
Michèle Lamont (2012) refers to various studies on a broad range of topics 
that, however, deal in each case with similar questions about the attribution and 
assessment of value. By subsuming different strands of research under a “soci-
ology of valuation and evaluation,” she calls for a dialogue between these 
different approaches and suggests theory-building for a more fundamental 
conceptualization of valuation and evaluation. Referring to Lamont in their 
editorial to the first issue of Valuation Studies, Claes-Fredrik Helgesson and 
Fabian Muniesa (2013) also point to diverse areas in sociological research that 
are currently dealing with forms of valuation. Their journal seeks to provide “a 
good amalgamating area that facilitates dialogue and debate between different 
scholars of different approaches and disciplines” (Helgesson and Muniesa 
2013, 3). However, they also notice a problematic aspect in their rather broad 
conceptualization of “valuation as a social practice” (ibid., 4). Seeking to inte-
grate as many of the existing studies from various areas as possible into valua-
tion studies, then, valuation studies as a newly emerging research field is hard 
to demarcate. Taking this into account, Helgesson and Muniesa argue that the 
aim of valuation studies should therefore be to discuss, first of all, what value 
and valuation is basically about. Similarly, a special issue in Human Studies is 
in search for a sociology of valuation and evaluation as “a focus of perspective, 
transversal to all the social sciences” (Cefaï et al. 2015, 2). The introduction 
emphasizes that a “sociology of valuation and evaluation is not only concerned 
with a specific sector of social life or a minor segment of grand theories” but 
rather “opens an intellectual space in which core issues in the social sciences 
such as interaction, agency, values, norms, collective action, and the role of 
institutions are discussed” (ibid., 6).  
                                                             
1  Reviews of the literature with varying depth and foci are provided by Lamont (2012), Hay-
wood et al. (2014), Cefaï et al. (2015). 
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The emerging field, as described here, does not only subsume different em-
pirical observations under the same label. It also explicitly builds on classical 
sociological theory and neighboring disciplines most notably on ideas from 
Émile Durkheim, Georg Simmel, or John Dewey (Beckert 2011; Bowker and 
Star 1999; Diaz-Bone 2011; Espeland and Stevens 1998, 2008; Fourcade 
2011a, 2011b; Lamont 2009; Munck and Zimmermann 2015; Stark 2009; 
Zelizer 1978, 2011). The preoccupation with valuation in sociology and neigh-
boring disciplines has furthermore a long-standing history and it is significant 
that these authors have interpreted valuation as more than a specific localizable 
phenomenon. Instead, they have analyzed valuation as a fundamental activity 
that is linked to or even constitutes the fundament of the social. A sociology of 
valuation, therefore, must not only turn to presently witnessed phenomena. It 
moreover has a long-standing history in social theory that needs to be taken 
into account while theorizing valuation practices such as classification.  
Our contribution to the current discussion is twofold: We will present prom-
inent lines of thought in social theory that have addressed valuation as a fun-
damental social activity and outlined insights into its significance to social life. 
The selected range of theories is necessarily limited but represents influential 
lines of thought that shape recent discussions. Furthermore, we will delineate 
central assumptions and key concepts by arranging them into five building 
blocks for developing an analytical perspective for theorizing valuation. We 
thereby pay attention to similarities but also to incompatibilities between dif-
ferent lines of thought.  
3.  Social Structure as Source of Valuation – Émile 
Durkheim  
Émile Durkheim’s study on the elementary forms of religious life analyzes the 
development and the structure of classificatory systems that attribute value to 
objects and practices (Durkheim 1912) and represents an important point of 
reference for valuation studies. He focuses on primitive religions as the ade-
quate subject for analyzing religion as a fundamental social phenomenon. 
Durkheim defines religion as based on two central classifications – the sacred 
and the profane.2 Religious thinking thus means classifying the material and 
immaterial world into these two opposite classes.  
Jointly with Marcel Mauss, Durkheim furthermore finds that sacred objects 
and practices are sorted into distinct groups (Durkheim and Mauss 1987). They 
                                                             
2  See for a more detailed discussion on the definition of religion the first chapter of the first 
part of this study (Durkheim 1912) where Durkheim problematizes existing understandings 
and develops this basic definition.  
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show that these classification groups originate from social groups with a par-
ticular position within a hierarchical social order (ibid., 179, 250 et seq.). The 
structure of social order thus provides the classificatory system for sorting 
objects and practices into distinct groups; thereby organizing them into a par-
ticular hierarchy. This hierarchical order ascribes a specific value to objects and 
practices. Their interrelatedness within this hierarchical order makes classifica-
tion possible. It is critical for assessing their value and for understanding how 
the different objects and practices fit into a coherent perception of the world as 
a whole (ibid., 249). Classificatory systems are therefore not only central for 
defining whether something is sacred or profane and for grouping specific 
objects and practices together or apart, but moreover for defining the interrelat-
edness of objects and practices as the fundamental origin of valuation and 
sense-making. A classificatory system and the specific interrelatedness of dif-
ferent objects and practices are collectively shared beliefs that provide meaning 
for corresponding actions.  
Both authors therefore describe classification as a fundamental social activi-
ty. Besides sorting objects and practices, classification means a process of 
valuation that emerges from the hierarchical interrelatedness of social groups. 
Classification generates a hierarchical order that entails valuation which pro-
vides the ground for making sense of the world. However, this order in itself is 
grounded in a pregiven social hierarchy. Durkheim and Mauss’s understanding of 
classification and valuation is thus inseparably linked to social hierarchy. The 
hierarchical classification of society provides the ground for the classification and 
valuation of objects and practices. This implies that if the hierarchical social order 
is destabilized through economic collapse but also through sudden economic 
wealth, then the classificatory system for valuating and understanding the social 
world also becomes instable (Durkheim 1897). Thus, from Durkheim’s point of 
view, not only are classificatory systems inseparably linked to a hierarchical 
social order but provide through this link the basis for normativity. When the 
social order dissolves, the normative classificatory system gets lost. In this view, 
classification, i.e. hierarchical classification, is the fundament of the social.3  
4.  Subjectivity as Source of Valuation – Georg Simmel 
Georg Simmel’s insights into a sociology of valuation differ in one crucial 
point from those by Durkheim and Mauss. It is not the collective representation 
                                                             
3  Durkheim’s view has been discussed extensively, critically and celebratory. Our aim in this 
paper, however, is not to retrace the discussion of classical approaches up to the present 
but to identify conceptual elements that keep recurring over time and between different 
approaches. The accounts of the different approaches we are able to give are thus neces-
sarily rudimentary. 
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of social order that provides the template for a classificatory system. On the 
contrary, it is the subjective attribution of value that creates a meaningful 
framework for ordering things and structuring the world.  
Economic sociologists have drawn especially on the Philosophy of Money 
(Simmel 1900) for analyzing phenomena such as the monetarization of non-
monetary goods, for instance, human life (Zelizer 1978) or nature (Fourcade 
2011a, 2011b), as Simmel deals with the functionality of money in attributing 
value to objects and with the value of money as such. However, before elabo-
rating on how objects attain an objectively perceived but still subjective (eco-
nomic) value for the one who desires them and on the distinctive properties of 
money, Simmel posits some fundamental thoughts on the role of value for the 
subjective construction of meaning that produces a corresponding order among 
objects, thoughts, and experiences.  
No objective experiences are possible but only valuations of experiences 
that create what we perceive as objectively given reality. The subjective at-
tribution of value thus creates the order of social life. Nonetheless, the value of 
a particular object – although emerging from subjective judgement – is neither 
arbitrary nor random; it is subjective in that it is not a given property (Simmel 
2008 [1900], 29). However, it operates as a natural fact that cannot be changed 
or put into question easily. 
While Simmel, on the one hand, describes the value of an object as its “sub-
jectivity” (ibid.) emerging from subjective judgment, on the other hand, value 
and the process of valuation as such are naturally given phenomena. Value and 
valuation are defined as substantial for making sense of the world and therefore 
must be naturally given at any time as a precondition for social life. While 
value as the result of subjective valuations is a social product, the process of 
valuation and the existence of value are given facts. Simmel conceptualizes 
value as relational, similar to Durkheim. The explanation or the “Wertbeweis” 
(ibid., 27), i.e. the proof that something is valuable, depends on the value of 
other objects that are related to the object in question. Such classification is the 
fundamental operation for making sense of the world. 
Simmel therefore provides us with two basic insights: First, value is the sub-
jectivity of an object. It is not an objectively given property but a socially con-
structed judgment that nevertheless appears to individuals as natural fact. Simi-
lar to Durkheim who argues that the classification of particular objects into 
particular groups cannot be logically explained, Simmel also finds that there is 
no way of deducing the attribution of value to a particular object from any 
given facts. Only the relation that is set up between different objects, i.e. their 
classification, can explain why an object attains a particular value. This means, 
second, that value and valuation are the fundament of the social. This runs 
contrary to Durkheim who, from an anthropological point of view, interprets 
social hierarchy as the foundational explanation for a value order. Simmel 
instead finds that value and valuation are the precondition for social life. Every 
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human experience needs to be valuated in order to be cognitively understood. 
Valuation is thus fundamental for the attribution of meaning and for making 
sense of the world.  
5.  Trouble as Source of Valuation – John Dewey 
Claiming that valuation is an empirically observable phenomenon and asking 
for its empirical analysis and furthermore for a “theory of valuation” (Dewey 
1939), Dewey argues against approaches that see value as given and thus not 
accessible to empirical research. For him, valuation as a judgment about value 
(Dewey 1916) is immanent to each situation that involves problem-solving and 
decision-making. Valuation as a fundamental social activity becomes thus 
subject of inquiry.  
Dewey starts his investigation with an etymological analysis of the vocabu-
lary attached to value and valuation. The colloquial differentiation of valuation 
into “prizing” and “appraising” allows for insights into two elementary practic-
es of valuation (Dewey 1939, 5-6). “Prizing” is understood as a subjective and 
emotional decision about attributing value to something or somebody. The 
attribution of value through prizing thus has a definite personal reference. “Ap-
praising”, on the other hand, focuses on estimating the properties of something 
or somebody in relation to others as an intellectual process. Appraisal thus 
involves an act of comparison. This differentiation of valuation into emotional 
prizing through personal desires and interests (ibid., chap. 3) and intellectual 
appraisal based on comparison (ibid., chap. 4) becomes the point of reference 
for the development of Dewey’s theory of valuation. 
Dewey’s point of departure for studying valuation are situations that are be-
yond mere routine but comprise some kind of problem or “trouble” (ibid., 33). 
Trouble either arises when multiple preferences occur at the same time or due 
to the resistance of environmental conditions to ongoing action. In these situa-
tions, reflection upon individual desires and interests becomes necessary, in-
volving thoughts about the value of desirable ends, the valuation of the means 
that need to be invested, and the anticipated consequences according to the 
environmental conditions of the situation (ibid., 35). Dewey thereby criticizes 
“the belief that there are such things as ends having value apart from valuation 
of the means by which they are reached” (ibid., 36). Prizing and appraising 
cannot be separated into distinct processes of prizing specific ends and of ap-
praising appropriate means. Prizing can only take place alongside the appraisal 
of necessary means that are needed for achieving particular desirable ends. 
Valuation thus happens as an integrated process of defining “ends-in-view”, i.e. 
of defining a specific purpose that expresses anticipated results and a particular 
means-end relation that corresponds with the specific conditions of a particular 
situation. Situations in which valuation occurs are thus any situation “whenever 
HSR 42 (2017) 1  │  271 
behavior succeeds in intelligent projection of ends-in-view that direct activity 
to resolution of antecedent trouble” (ibid., 49).  
The focus of ends-in-view as a “plan” that relates anticipated results to in-
vested means emphasizes that Dewey regards valuation as a process that is 
inseparably bound to the perception of a problem (see Joas 1999, 168). Valua-
tion is inherent to any situation in which an individual cannot routinely rely on 
an existing order (ibid.), but needs to reflect and decide consciously about 
further action and hence about the adequate valuation of appropriate means and 
ends. Thus, every situation that takes place beyond everyday routines entails 
the need to decide about further action which makes it necessary to reflect upon 
the preferences for certain ends and the possibilities for realizing them. This 
idea of reflection about certain desires, possible means, and the conditions of a 
particular situation demonstrates that Dewey does not envision a fixed value 
order or a valuation standard that always attributes the same value to the same 
ends. On the contrary, valuation of desirable ends depends on the valuation of 
the means that are necessary for achieving them which again depends on the 
specific context of a particular situation. In addition, this reflection may change 
what was considered as desirable at first. For new “troublesome” situations a 
standard for valuating future results is simply not possible (Dewey 2004 
[1916], 241).4 In Dewey’s view, therefore, value emerges only from reflection 
within a particular situation and can neither be thought of as a fixed objective 
standard nor as a given subjective feeling nor as intrinsic to certain objects or 
practices (Dewey 1939, 10-1, 26-7). Valuation is instead a specific intervention 
that reorganizes a particular situation by promoting a future course of action 
based on whether something is good and on how good it is (Dewey 2004 
[1916], 229-31). Value thus only comes into effect when actions based on 
value judgments are taken.  
At least three conclusions can be drawn from Dewey’s theory of valuation5: 
First, every situation beyond “business as usual” makes reflection about prefer-
ences and thus about the value of means and ends necessary. No fixed standard 
value order proclaims the only possible way of dealing with unforeseen “trou-
ble.” Instead, diverging preferences about means and ends make reflection 
necessary in order to prize and appraise what is best in a given situation. This 
demonstrates, second, that valuation consists of the attribution of value and of 
value assessment at the same time: The assessment of certain means influences 
the attribution of value to specific ends. Thus, the attribution of value and 
therefore individual preferences about what is desirable can change. This indi-
cates, third, that means-ends relations always emerge from valuation processes 
                                                             
4  Although Dewey admits that “a certain order of precedence” (1916, 245) based on past 
experiences can be established which is, however, always only presumptive.  
5  He recognizes that he rather provides “the conditions which such a theory must satisfy” 
(ibid., 53) than outlining a complete theory of valuation. 
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and cannot be thought of as pre-given facts. Judgment about means and ends 
always is a judgment about their value in the light of anticipated results within 
a particular situation. 
6.  Justification as Valuation – French Neopragmatism 
Neopragmatism is one of the labels attached to the work of a group of French 
researchers (Groupe de Sociologie Politique et Morale, GSPM) most notably 
Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot.6 In the beginning of the group, the label 
may have been nothing more than a signal of opposition against the sociology 
of Pierre Bourdieu but the ensuing work shows notable continuities with prag-
matism and especially with the work of Dewey (Bogusz 2013). In their ac-
count, critical situations are moments of indeterminacy that give rise to the 
need for actors to justify their viewpoints and actions. These are mostly situa-
tions of conflict in which opponents do not resort to violence but negotiate by 
invoking “justice” or “being justified” as the measure of discourse (Boltanski 
and Thévenot 2006). Justification relies on “orders of worth” which represent 
“collective conventions of equivalence” (Boltanski and Thévenot 1999, 362). 
Initially, Boltanski and Thévenot proposed six orders of worth: inspired, do-
mestic, civic, opinion, market, and industrial. Integral to each of these orders 
are rules determining what is deemed valuable. In a dispute, for instance, one 
opponent may rely on a civic mode of valuation by claiming that his view 
represents the collective interest, while another may rely on the market as mode 
of valuation by claiming that his view offers a solution that is less costly in a 
monetary sense. Internally, orders of worth are structured hierarchically while, 
in relation to each other, these orders have no common measure according to 
which the worth of an object would be comparable. Conflicts can be resolved 
when opponents agree on the order of worth that is suitable for the situation. If, 
however, opponents rely on different orders of worth to justify their position, a 
fragile compromise is the best possible resolution (Boltanski and Thévenot 
2006, 275 et seq.). 
Both, Dewey as well as Boltanski and Thévenot, emphasize the capabilities 
of individual actors to handle indeterminacy in extraordinary situations either 
through “intelligent action” or “justification” and both anchor these capabilities 
in the reflexive handling of valuation practices. For Dewey, valuation happens 
as judgements about relationships of means to ends that seem accessible in the 
situation. For Boltanski and Thévenot, the situation is less indeterminate in that 
                                                             
6  The many labels – neopragmatism, sociology of conventions, sociology of critical capacity, 
sociology of tests – may seem confusing at first, but reflect the far-reaching claims and the 
theoretical development inherent in the groups work over the past 30 years (Diaz-Bone 
2015, Potthast forthcoming). 
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valuation must rely on a limited number of orders or worth in which judge-
ments about relationships between means and ends are already determined. In 
classical pragmatism, valuation is born out of individual, psychological capa-
bilities while neopragmatism takes a more structural and sociological stance by 
focusing on the interplay between value orders and valuation practices in situa-
tions of conflict. However, this is far from conceptualizing society primarily as 
order but preserves the pragmatist view that society is a permanent process of 
ordering (Bogusz 2013, 314).  
By adding a structural component (orders of worth) to a pragmatist view of 
situations, the question must be raised of how structural and situational ele-
ments work together in such a mode of valuation. Boltanski and Thévenot 
propose, alongside science and technology studies and actor-network-theory, a 
specific valuation practice in which situational justifications are related to 
orders of worth: “tests” (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006, 127 et seq.).  
The involvement of objects requires human beings to rise to the occasion, to 
objectify themselves by bringing objects into play and valorizing them, that is, 
endowing them with value. The use of valorized objects allows people to 
compare the singular situation in which they find themselves with other situa-
tions; recourse to the higher common principle can be achieved by means of 
tools. Objects substantiate worth, but at the same time they impose constraints 
on tests by calling for valorization. (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006, 131)  
In critical situations, the value of certain objects and actors is unclear or contest-
ed, calling for tests to establish the value within one or multiple orders of worth. 
Tests are the equivalent to Dewey’s intelligent or experimental action in that they 
reduce complexity or remove indeterminacy by attributing value to objects. For 
valorization to work, the test has to establish a stable connection between the 
object and an order of worth thus making value structures part of the situation and 
part of the test. It is the valorized objects that “translate” the value structures from 
one situation to the next. As long as their value is commonly accepted they re-
main invisible and value structures are reproduced largely unchanged. Only when 
conflict about the value of an object arises a test updates the value of the object 
and possibly the value structure, as orders of worth are historically changing. 
7.  Money as Valuation – Economic Sociology 
Since the departure from what David Stark (2000) has called the Parsons’ Pact, 
i.e., that sociologists deal with values and economists with value, economic 
sociology has struggled with the question of the social construction of markets 
and of value in markets. The economy is no longer seen as external to society 
but as in itself deeply social. The value of goods is nothing fixed and objective-
ly given but results from social valuation processes in which the value of some-
thing is constructed (Aspers and Beckert 2011). Fourcade’s work on the mone-
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tary valuation of the invaluable in the case of nature and the oil spill litigations 
in France and the United States (Fourcade 2011a, 2011b) is one telling exam-
ple. She draws on Simmel and his idea that the objectification of subjective 
value in money is bidirectional in that it creates even more subjective value in 
the moment of sacrificing money for it. She suggests that economic valuation 
increases subjectively experienced value. In this, she furthermore refers to 
earlier work by Viviana Zelizer on the value of human life (Zelizer 1978), i.e., 
on “life insurance as a prudent investment in the future rather than an obscene 
wager on human mortality” (Zelizer 2011, 4) and on the value of children 
(Zelizer 1985), i.e., on “how Americans shifted from treating children as eco-
nomic assets to considering them as priceless” (Zelizer 2011, 4). Zelizer was 
among the pioneers who contributed to the “resocialization” of economic val-
ue, by starting with the “problem of establishing monetary equivalences for 
such things as death, life, human organs, and generally ritualized items or be-
havior considered sacred” and wondering whether “the absorption of many 
social scientists with ‘market’ models and the notion of economic man led 
them and others to disregard certain complexities in the interaction between the 
market and human values” (Zelizer 1978, 592). Drawing on Durkheim and 
Simmel, she deals with the phenomenon of putting a monetary price on emo-
tionally charged sacred things. In her account, the quantity of money becomes 
the expression for subjectively ascribed value pointing to a cultural change in 
perspective. A relationship between the sacred, such as human life, and the 
profane, such as money, is established. To price the invaluable is no longer 
regarded as the sacrilegious intent to spend money on something intrinsically 
priceless. Instead, spending money on something sacred becomes regarded as 
attributing even more value to it. Sacred things become worthy to spend money 
on. Classifying the monetary value of sacred things thus raises their subjective 
value.  
Zelizer’s work has become a prominent point of reference within economic 
sociology, where the question of the construction of monetary value is central. 
Numerous further studies address the market itself as the locus of value con-
struction (see Hutter and Throsby 2008; Beckert and Aspers 2011; Beckert and 
Musselin 2013; Antal et al. 2015). Fourcade and Healy (2017 [2013]) – as 
already mentioned – go even one step further. They focus not only on the social 
influence on markets or processes of attribution of value through markets but 
moreover on the influence of value attribution through markets on social struc-
ture. 
HSR 42 (2017) 1  │  275 
8.  Commensuration and Quantification as Valuation – 
Sociology of Science  
Questions of quantification and commensuration provide another take on the 
problem of classification and valuation. Theodore Porter (1986, 1995), Alain 
Desrosières (1998), or Bettina Heintz (2012) have emphasized the phenomena of 
quantification and commensuration in their works on the rise of national and 
international statistics. Sharing a perspective on statistics not simply as an as-
sessment of national or international conditions, they point to the authoritative 
effects of statistics as classification systems where categories are not just defined 
in order to capture “the world out there” but rather to contribute to its creation.  
In their special issue in Historical Social Research on conventions and 
quantification, Rainer Diaz-Bone and Emmanuel Didier provide a transdisci-
plinary perspective on statistics (Diaz-Bone and Didier 2016). Jointly with 
authors such as Laurent Thévenot or Etienne Penissat et al. they highlight that 
categorization and classification are essential for quantifying the social world 
and for fitting it into statistical figures and numbers. 
Wendy Espeland and Mitchell Stevens have also given this research a more 
generalized theoretical turn. They draw on Simmel’s Philosophy of Money 
(among others) and the objectification of the value of a particular entity into 
generalizable money allowing for the comparison of disparate entities. As 
commensuration this process is defined as “the transformation of different 
qualities into a common metric” (Espeland and Stevens 1998, 314). They re-
gard this practice as “crucial to how we categorize and make sense of the 
world” (ibid.). Commensuration relies on the quantification of social phenome-
na (Espeland and Stevens 2008) by which qualities are translated into (numer-
ic) quantities that can be compared easily in standardized ways. Because it 
“changes the terms of what can be talked about, how we value, and how we 
treat what we value [...], commensuration is no mere technical process but a 
fundamental feature of social life” (Espeland and Stevens 1998, 315). Com-
mensuration thus creates new relationships between otherwise disparate entities 
by sorting them into the same category thereby making them comparable and 
open for valuation.  
The political dimension of commensuration lies in that it establishes “new 
interpretive frameworks” for the perception of reality through constructing new 
categories and hierarchies (ibid., 323). Commensuration is thus, on the one 
hand, a process of homogenizing differences by assigning disparate entities to 
the same category. On the other hand, it reduces disparate entities down to one 
particular aspect that becomes the one and only criterion of distinction and thus 
emphasizes differences even more.  
Valuation through commensuration therefore takes place in three ways. 
First, value is attributed in choosing a particular perspective on the world that is 
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turned into a category under which disparate entities are subsumed. Second, by 
subsuming disparate entities under the same category their qualities are turned 
into calculable quantities that already express value. And third, the attribution of 
value takes place in the application of a common metric that allows for compari-
son and thus for the classification of different entities in ratings and rankings.  
9.  Categorization and Classification as Valuation – 
Science and Technology Studies 
Durkheim and Mauss’ focus on classification has been the source of inspiration 
for Geoffrey Bowker and Susan Leigh Star’s Sorting Things Out (1999). Here, 
classification works in “ordering human interaction” (ibid., 5) by attributing 
value to objects, practices, and, in particular, to people. They define classifica-
tion as “a spatial, temporal, or spatio-temporal segmentation of the world” 
based on “consistent, unique classificatory principles” and “mutually exclu-
sive” categories (ibid., 10). Classification therefore depends on making every-
thing fit into predefined categories within a particular area or aspect of life. 
With regard to the health system, Bowker and Star demonstrate how the diag-
nosis of illnesses depends on the classification of symptoms into given catego-
ries. The arrangement of entities within a particular category or of a set of 
categories within a broader classification system depends on a particular logic 
such as i.e. the severity of an illness or the costs of its treatment that puts them 
into a specific hierarchical order.  
Delineated in such a way, classification is always based on valuation in a 
twofold way. First, constructing exclusive categories that are designed to cap-
ture the entire area of a particular issue either causes the exclusion of those 
entities that do not fit or imposes a redefinition of them from the outside. Sec-
ond, arranging the categories into a particular classificatory order implies a 
differentiated attribution of value to them. Yet, contrary to Durkheim and 
Mauss, Bowker and Star do not regard a given social hierarchy as the structur-
ing principle for classification. Instead, they stress the constructedness of cate-
gories and classification systems and their impact on social structure. A com-
monly accepted classification system presents but one picture of reality that 
however claims – the more it is widely spread and standardized – to be the only 
existing one. Bowker and Star thus demonstrate that the construction of catego-
ries and classification systems is a process of valuation. By assigning objects, 
practices, and people into specific categories within particular classification 
systems such as, e.g., classifying homosexuality as an illness, but also by ne-
glecting and forgetting others, the attribution of value takes place.  
Bowker and Star furthermore emphasize their point on classification as val-
uation by referring to the growing importance of technological infrastructure. 
Classification systems are increasingly used for making objects and practices 
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accessible and accountable. They constitute the framework for databases which 
are sought to collect and provide information about particular areas or aspects 
of life. However, at the same time, they do not simply capture “reality.” In-
stead, through assigning objects, practices, and people to a fixed set of catego-
ries they influence how they are perceived and, furthermore, perform(ed). This 
classification-based infrastructure thus not only provides information about the 
material and social world but helps to create it.  
Bowker and Star therefore seek to make us aware of the political and ethical 
dimensions of classification. Categorization and classification are valuation prac-
tices in that they have political and ethical implications by defining how objects, 
practices, and people ought to be understood and valorized. “Each standard and 
each category valorizes some point of view and silences another” (ibid., 5). They 
thus highlight that the construction of categories and classification systems, me-
diated through technological infrastructure, effects social structure. 
10.  Building Blocks for Theories of Valuation 
Taking a broad view on a sociology of valuation reveals numerous and diverse 
empirical studies on valuation as well as intricate and long-lived theoretical 
thinking on value and valuation as a fundamental aspect of the social. By re-
viewing some of the empirical literature and, more importantly, three theoreti-
cal strands extending to the present we aim to reduce some of the complexity in 
the field to identify suitable elements for theorizing and analyzing valuation 
phenomena. Reflecting the current sociological discourse while keeping relevant 
traditions of theoretical thinking in view, we suggest five building blocks for 
future theoretical and analytical work in the sociology of valuation: valuation 
practices, value structures, valuation infrastructure, valuation situations, and 
reflexivity of valuation. These building blocks7 represent commonalities that 
span large areas of the current sociology of valuation and indicate aspects of 
valuation that will be difficult to neglect.  
“Classification” and many other central terms in the debate – categorization, 
comparison, commensuration, commodification, standardization, evaluation, 
etc. – clearly indicate a preoccupation with action. These valuation practices 
imply doing valuation either in terms of attributing or in terms of assessing 
value. They are crucial for producing and reproducing value. Speaking with 
Dewey, valuation entails the practices of “prizing” and “appraising” the value 
of objects, practices, and people. Both can be found wherever non-routinized 
action takes place, thus, requiring the prizing and appraisal of appropriate 
                                                             
7  The labels for these building blocks should not be confused with theoretical concepts, as their 
main purpose is to meaningfully relate different ideas by different authors to each other. 
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means and desirable ends. Valuation is therefore immanently practiced when-
ever problem-solving and decision-making becomes necessary. Durkheim and 
Mauss furthermore emphasize that valuation practices are fundamental to 
sense-making. Classifying objects and practices into a hierarchical order pro-
vides the ground for the construction of reality. Simmel argues in a similar way 
that valuation is fundamental for making sense of the world and thus for guid-
ing action. The action side of valuation and thus how valuation is practiced is 
exemplarily demonstrated in studies by Fourcade and Zelizer on pricing for-
merly priceless entities or by Bowker and Star or Espeland and Stevens, who 
provide insights into practices of categorization, classification, and commensu-
ration. In these studies, analyzing valuation practices has contributed to a pro-
cess perspective on valuation that highlights how actions lead to the attribution 
or assessment of value and thereby to the construction of reality. Boltanski and 
Thévenot are even more specific by tying valuation practices to the need for 
justifying action in a contested public setting.  
Yet, there is no practice without a relation to structure because by attributing 
value, valuation practices contribute to producing order. Similarly, by assessing 
value, valuation practices contribute to its reproduction. Valuation is thus in-
separably linked to value structures: Valuation produces or reproduces value 
structures that persist as an objectified element of the social beyond specific 
situations and practices. In the case of Durkheim, the attribution of value to 
objects, practices, and people reproduces preexisting social hierarchies. A value 
structure in terms of a classificatory value system for sorting objects, practices, 
and people into a hierarchical value order derives from the structure of social 
order. Contrary to Durkheim, Simmel suggests that it is the subjective percep-
tion of value, which is, however, understood as intrinsic to objects, practices, 
and people, that creates a meaningful value structure for ordering and thus for 
making sense of the world. More recently, the implicit structures that influence 
valuation practices have received attention from Boltanski and Thévenot as 
“orders of worth.” Here, we also find the idea of a pregiven, but historically 
changeable, value structure that, however, in this case is explicitly defined as a 
plurality of coexisting orders of worth that are reproduced whenever action 
takes place. Bowker and Star as well as Espeland and Stevens, instead, focus 
on the emergence of value structures through valuation practices that further-
more lead to consequences in social structure as also Fourcade and Healy have 
demonstrated.  
This immaterial value structure has material aspects not only in its conse-
quences but moreover in its translation into valuation infrastructure: Ideas on 
the importance of infrastructure in valuation processes have their representa-
tives in particular in the more recent literature. Fourcade and Healy provide a 
telling example for the role of technological infrastructure as a problem for the 
sociology of valuation. Their account of market classification is especially 
interested in data infrastructure and algorithms necessary to value people ac-
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cording to their past market behavior. In the case of Espeland and Stevens, 
numerical representation plays a key role in valuation. They describe quantifi-
cation as the prominent trend behind the construction of tools for measuring the 
world. Calculation devices, databases, and algorithms are core interests of 
Bowker and Star, who particularly emphasize the power of such tools in prac-
ticing valuation and creating value structure. However, additionally, they intro-
duce a much broader understanding of infrastructure that comprises “a set of 
working practices, beliefs, narratives and organizational routines” (Bowker and 
Star 1999, 319). Infrastructure is thus by no means reducible to technology but 
consists of any kind of facilitating support that provides the operational basis 
for practicing valuation. Altogether, these authors underline that such infra-
structure never plays a mere value-reproducing role but rather contributes es-
sentially to changes in value structure.  
Yet, material and immaterial structures and practices are frequently dis-
cussed as depending on temporally and spatially defined valuation situations: 
The need to pay attention to valuation situations stems from conceptualizing 
valuation as practice and thus as specifically situated in space and time – not 
only physically but also socially. It also follows from the insight that valuation, 
with respect to process and outcome, depends on the specific contexts in which 
valuation practices take place. Dewey points to the situativeness of nonrou-
tinized action. He claims that there is no such thing as a fixed value order. 
Instead, he points to the environmental conditions of a particular situation that 
crucially influence the valuation of means and ends. The situativeness of valua-
tion practices is also fundamental to the work of Boltanski and Thévenot. Alt-
hough there are multiple value structures present that can be used to justify 
corresponding action, it is in a particular yet indeterminate situation that these 
value structures are put into a distinct order that then allows for action. The 
work of Fourcade and Healy is also insightful here. Classification (practice) 
takes place in markets (situation) to produce classification situations (struc-
ture). Although the term “classification situation” may be misleading,8 it is 
evident that the interest in classification as valuation derives from its situational 
embeddedness and its structural consequences.  
Another concept that always comes with the focus on the situativeness of 
action is the question of reflexivity of valuation: In studies on valuation, reflex-
ivity is often conceptualized as the break with routines and thus as the trigger 
for valuation. The idea of reflexivity can thus be considered as inherent to 
valuation practices and situations. Dewey emphasizes reflexivity as crucial for 
                                                             
8  The term “classification situation” may be misleading in this case, as it refers to a structural 
and not a situational element. It is derived from Max Weber's term “class situation” which in 
the German original reads “Klassenlage” (Fourcade and Healy 2013, 560-1, Weber 1980, 177 
et seq.). “Lage,” in German, blurs the distinction between situation and structure and can be 
translated as “situation” or as “position.” 
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valuation. He claims that valuation is triggered by the perception of a problem 
that calls for valuating means and ends in order to solve it. The perception of a 
problem is thereby inseparably linked to breaking with routines, which pro-
vides the ground for reflexive thinking. One possible way of breaking with 
routines happens in situations of conflict. This take on reflexivity is promoted 
by Boltanski and Thévenot. “Critical moments” bear the chance of reflecting 
about a situation and thus of redefining the attribution of value to particular 
objects, practices, and people. Reflexivity can thus be understood as the pre-
requisite for attributing or assessing value in a yet uncertain situation. The idea 
of reflexivity can even be taken one step further by understanding reflexivity 
either as the cause for further valuation or as the valuation about valuation. 
This understanding points to a second aspect of reflexivity as reflexiveness. It 
refers to the effects of valuation practices not only on the attribution and as-
sessment of value but furthermore on social structure. This particular reflexive-
ness is emphasized by Fourcade and Healy as well as by Espeland and Stevens 
and by Bowker and Star as the crucial task of a sociology that deals with ques-
tions of valuation.  
Summing up these five building blocks, we claim that theorizing valuation 
to analyze empirical phenomena must include a conceptual understanding of 
valuation practices, immaterial and/or material value structures, and valuation 
infrastructures accompanied by an awareness of situational aspects and consid-
erations of reflexivity. The building blocks thus provide an analytical perspec-
tive for further research on valuation. They moreover allow for further insights 
into valuation processes in existing research.  
Simone Schiller-Merkens’ contribution to this HSR Special Issue (Schiller-
Merkens 2017) can serve as a telling example for how we suggest theorizing 
valuation with reference to the five building blocks. Her analysis of ethical 
fashion designers and their self-categorization provides a pertinent case-study. 
She stresses valuation practices that are discursive (self-descriptions on web-
sites), address changing and expanding audiences over time (investors, British 
Fashion Council, consumers) and thus exhibit ways in which compromises are 
found to accommodate heterarchical value structures (ethical, esthetic, and 
economical frames). Schiller-Merkens highlights the embeddedness of these 
valuation practices in valuation situations with her focus on biannual spring 
fairs organized by the British Fashion Council featuring multiple valuation 
situations that provide similar value infrastructures (fashion shows) and are 
linked over time. Schiller-Merkens’ analysis is particularly telling with respect 
to the reflexivity of valuation in that the connectedness of similar valuation 
situations and infrastructures allows actors to adjust their valuation practices by 
drawing on changing value structures. 
This study on self-categorization in the ethical fashion market therefore also 
provides a relevant case for a sociology of valuation. It illustrates, first, that the 
building blocks generally are core elements of studies on valuation that are 
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crucial to identify in empirical work and, second, that they provide a backdrop 
for further theoretical discussion beyond the specific case. This discussion may, 
on the one hand, relate to how the individual building blocks are conceptual-
ized. Schiller-Merkens, for instance, conceptualizes value structures as frames 
thereby providing an alternative to e.g. Boltanski and Thèvenot’s orders of 
worth. On the other hand, the building blocks may alert to new aspects that 
point to particularities of cases that can, however, be built upon in following 
studies. In the case of Schiller-Merkens, these are the particular dynamics that 
take place from one valuation situation to the next or the specific influence of 
audiences on valuation that add to the theorization of valuation. 
11. Valuation between Practice and Structure – Conclusion 
In this paper, we have highlighted that classification is more than a distinct 
empirical phenomenon only taking place in markets but rather a fundamental 
activity of the social. Starting from Fourcade and Healy’s insights on classifica-
tion in markets we have sought to demonstrate that classification can be de-
scribed as a valuation practice that is omnipresent in social life. We have fur-
thermore shown that the major challenges for a sociology of valuation that 
reaches beyond particular fields of study lie in the search for common ground that 
cannot be provided simply by an extension of already existing theories. Calling 
for a multitude of theories of valuation, we have identified central assumptions 
and key concepts within different theoretical approaches that need to be taken 
into account when theorizing valuation. As a result, we have suggested five 
building blocks – valuation practices, value structures, valuation infrastructure, 
valuation situations, and reflexivity of valuation – theories of valuation need to 
consider being able to deal with empirical valuation phenomena. 
However, besides their conceptualization, the question needs to be raised 
how these building blocks relate to each other. Regarding self-categorization in 
the ethical fashion market, Schiller-Merkens points to the relation between 
reflexivity and value structures when she demonstrates how ethical fashion 
designers reflect about the audience they address and therefore adjust the value 
structure. Thus, Schiller-Merkens’ study on the ethical fashion market can be 
seen to contribute to the more general question on how stable compromises 
between heterarchical value structures are achieved.  
In addition, we find that the question of the interplay, in particular between 
valuation practice and value structure is crucial to a sociology of valuation, 
especially since a strong basis in practice theory striving to transcend the di-
chotomy between practice and structure is present in writings on valuation. 
Discussing the relation especially between valuation practice and value struc-
ture, may provide new fuel for “[t]he question of how individual action brings 
about and reproduces social structures at higher levels of aggregation, which at 
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the same time constitute the opportunities and constraints for social action, [...] 
characterized as the ‘Holy Grail’ of sociology” (von Scheve 2014, 5; DiMaggio 
1991). This aligns with a theoretical trend within sociology to exchange the 
problem of the relation between social structure and individual action for an 
emphasis on the practical nature of the social, the generation of structure from 
practice and the presence of social structure in situations of practice (Giddens 
1984; Sewell 1992; Schatzki et al. 2001). It is the focus on valuation situations, 
which allow for reflexivity, that seem to transcend the divide of practice and 
structure. Even though conceptually, structures and situations tend to be incor-
porated in the description of valuation practices, questions surrounding the role 
of structure and the specifics of situations are regularly raised, e.g. by the work 
of Boltanski and Thévenot. 
Furthermore, a general theoretical trend in sociology – especially visible in 
practice theory and actor network theory – to dissolve the distinction between 
practice and structure has not only led to a preoccupation with situations but 
also with materiality and technology. Valuation infrastructure seems thus an-
other take on overcoming the divide because as described by Fourcade and 
Healy it is the technological infrastructure that not only provides a value struc-
ture for assessing value but also practices valuation by influencing the attribu-
tion of value to people. 
Dealing with classification as a practice of valuation can therefore not only 
contribute to the analysis of classification in markets. Moreover, studying clas-
sification as part of a sociology of valuation may provide insights to answer 
predominant questions not only in the sociology of markets but in sociological 
theory in general. 
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